The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exposed a major contradiction in post-Cold War Indian foreign policy. With India’s emergence as one of the major powers in the post-Cold War period, it still doesn’t have a grand strategy to pursue the objectives of facilitating the emergence of a multipolar world order.
India’s Cold War policy of maintaining equidistance between the two blocs has given way to a new post-Cold War framework of engagement at multiple levels with all states in a globalising and increasingly multipolar world. It’s a strategy in which India can manage to improve its economy, ensure its security and also pave the way for its great power status. To that end, it has established strategic relations with all major powers including its major security threat—China.
This strategy is under trial now. One problem is it is confronted with Chinese territorial aggression and cannot take for granted that Chinese power will be tolerant of India’s rise. The second problem is how to manage the antagonistic relations between the other major powers. The US and European partners have been exerting considerable pressure on India to take sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and support the sanctions to make them effective. India did not even support the UN resolutions condemning the Russian invasion.
This has been construed as support for Russia, and some have argued that this might damage the burgeoning relationship with the US and other European powers. Even though India has not condemned Russian aggression, it has clearly stated that it does not support the war and has called for a cessation of violence. Many fail to comprehend India’s balancing act between Russia and the western powers. The argument that India is strongly dependent on Russia for its defence needs is missing the larger picture.
Russia is critical to the emergence of a multipolar world order. It is unlikely that it will be a contending power to the US. But it will remain or even further rise as a power. It is not in India’s interest to see Russia being pushed into the Chinese camp. Russia realises that given the heft of Chinese power, it can only be a junior partner if such an alliance emerges. Therefore, it will be in Russia’s interest to promote India’s rise. Russia continues to maintain strong ties with India; their mutual relationship is beneficial to both.
Russia like the US has not taken sides in the clashes between India and China. Russia’s opposition to the Quad is also well-known and it believes that the US-led Quad is undermining the close relationship between Russia and India. India has to impress on Russia that it is not a treaty ally in the Quad and that the Quad is mainly to counter China’s growing belligerence in the Indo-Pacific region. It is in India’s interest to ensure that Russia does not side with China in the India-China disputes. It is imperative that India will use all means available to it to balance China and that interest is served only by not pushing Russia into the Chinese camp.
India’s strategic interest may not always align with Russia or the US. Both powers have to show the maturity to deal with their differences with India. India will continue to strive for autonomy in its foreign policy decision-making and not align itself closely to any major power in the pursuit of a multipolar global order. The US may be coming to terms with that message, evident in the successful conduct of the recently concluded 2+2 India-US dialogue.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a defining moment in contemporary global politics. It has posed a challenge to India’s policy of multi-alignment in the post-Cold War period. India has to adroitly do some tightrope walking to balance its relationship with the US and Russia. Its choices and strategy will influence the post-Ukraine world order.
Ajay Darshan Behera is Professor and Officiating Director of the Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi